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Following the surge of bankruptcies in the wake of the Great Recession, a growing and some-
what controversial trend has emerged whereby companies seeking to purchase a debtor’s assets in
bankruptcy frequently make use of Section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“§363”).
In general, §363 sales are accomplished via public auction. This aspect of §363 exposes initial
bidders, known in bankruptcy as “stalking horse bidders,” to the risk that they will commit time
and resources in pursuit of the acquisition and yet fail to succeed as the prevailing bidder. To hedge
against this risk, stalking horse bidders frequently request “break-up fees” when negotiating a pur-
chase agreement for a §363 sale. There is no consensus among the Bankruptcy Courts as to how to
treat break-up fee provisions. Thus, the foundation of this Note is that the lack of a uniform break-
up fee standard is detrimental to the consistency of bankruptcy law and leaves debtors and stalking
horse bidders on unstable ground when utilizing §363. Courts predominantly use three standards
when reviewing a break-up fee provision in a §363 asset sale: the business judgment standard, the
best interests of the estate test, and the administrative expense test. Because all bankruptcy law
is, at its core, based in principles of equity, it only makes sense to develop a theory of break-up
fees based upon the philosophies underlying the law’s procedures. As such, this Note analyzes
break-up fees with a view toward the purpose of §363 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Using that
perspective, this Note argues in favor of using the best interests of the estate test when determining
whether to award break-up fees to stalking horse bidders in §363 sales.
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the estate test when determining whether to award break-up fees to 
stalking horse bidders in § 363 sales. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the United States has seen a significant increase in 
the number of distressed companies seeking to liquidate assets. 1  To 
complete this objective in bankruptcy, many companies make use of § 
363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which authorizes debtors to 
sell assets outside “the ordinary course of business.” 2  This statute 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, How to Handle Corporate Distress Sale 




 2. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012); see Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC 
(In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that § 363 sales “may 
well replace the main route of Chapter 11 reorganization plans”) (quotations omitted) 
(citation omitted). 
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permits debtors to sell assets free and clear of all liabilities and protects 
good faith purchasers from fraudulent transfer claims.3 In this regard, § 
363 provides for an orderly process by which bankrupt companies can 
maximize the resale value of their assets, while offering protections to 
buyers that make these distressed acquisitions very enticing to outside 
investors.4 
Alas, it is not always smooth sailing for § 363 purchasers.5 More 
often than not, a debtor sells its assets via public auction in order to 
maximize the sale price.6 Consequently, a potential purchaser exposes 
itself to the risk that it will commit valuable resources to pursue the 
acquisition yet ultimately fail to consummate the sale.7 This risk has led 
these proverbial stalking horse8 bidders to negotiate bidding incentives 
to hedge against their back-end risks. 9  Taking cues from traditional 
acquisition practice, a stalking horse bidder frequently requests break-up 
fees when negotiating a purchase agreement in a § 363 sale.10 A “break-
up fee” is a sum paid to the stalking horse bidder in the event that the 
stalking horse does not finalize the sale.11 Judicial treatment of break-up 
fees in traditional corporate combinations12 has been deferential to the 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); id. § 363(m) (2012). 
 4. Andrew S. Brown, Breaking Up and Making Out (Rich): Recommendations for 
Revision of Bankruptcy Code Provisions Governing Break-Up Fees Used by Stalking 
Horse Bidders in § 363 Bankruptcy Asset Sales, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (2010) 
(noting that the protections of § 363 “encourage private equity funds to venture into the 
bankruptcy court system and acquire bankrupt companies in whole or in part”). 
 5. See infra Part I. 
 6. See Ball & Kane, supra note 1, at 395 (“The objective of the auction process is 
to obtain the ‘highest and best’ offer for the assets, thus maximizing the proceeds to the 
estate and, indirectly, the seller’s creditors.”). 
 7. See Nicholas M. McGrath, Breaking Down Break-Up Fees: The Appropriate 
Standard, 2011 Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law 14, n.40-44 and text (2011) (“Cognizant of . . 
. the fact that the debtor is free to ‘window shop’ the asset, the stalking horse has a 
realistic concern that its time, expenses, and efforts may be wasted, or worse, utilized 
by a competitive bidder without any ‘assurance’ that it will ultimately be successful in 
acquiring the assets.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 8. See infra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 9. See McGrath, supra note 7, n.7-11 and text. 
 10. See infra Part II.A-B. 
 11. Peter C. Blain, Let’s Make a Deal: Sales of Distressed Businesses in Insolvency 
Proceedings, in Buying and Selling Distressed Businesses 137 (2010), available at 
2010 WL 6425211, at 9. 
 12. “Corporate Combinations” refers to a corporate mergers or acquisitions. 
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parties of the deal.13 Courts routinely approve negotiated break-up fees 
in challenged transactions. 14  In the context of bankruptcy, however, 
courts and scholars have not universally agreed upon the legitimacy of 
break-up fees. Contrary to most procedural aspects of bankruptcy law, a 
field in which almost everything is codified, determining the appropriate 
standard of review for break-up fees in § 363 sales has been left entirely 
to the discretion of the courts.15 As such, debate over the advantages, 
disadvantages, and necessity of break-up fees has led courts in different 
directions when deciding whether to award these fees to the stalking 
horse.16 The issue is inextricably linked to one of bankruptcy’s central 
purposes, the maximization of the value of the debtor’s estate.17 
Courts predominantly use three standards when reviewing a break-
up fee provision in a § 363 asset sale: the business judgment standard, 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Mark F. Hebbeln, The Economic Case for Judicial Deference to Break-Up 
Fee Agreements in Bankruptcy, 13 Bankr. Dev. J. 475, 478-79 (1997) (noting that 
“[o]utside bankruptcy, break-up fee agreements are presumptively valid under the 
business judgment rule” and that a decision protected by the business judgment rule can 
only be challenged on the basis of “bad faith, negligence, or self-dealing”). 
 14. Id. at 480-81; see e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 
2011 WL 2028076, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011), as revised (May 24, 2011) 
(denying a plaintiff’s challenge to a termination fee, where the fee “appear[ed] to have 
resulted from good faith, arm’s-length negotiations”); In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 
N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (protecting a board of directors decision to approve a 
merger agreement that contained, inter alia, a “termination fee”, under the business 
judgment rule); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant corporation with respect to the 
plaintiff shareholders challenge of certain deal protection provisions in a merger 
agreement, including a termination fee). 
 15. See Bruce A. Markell, The Case Against Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 66 Am. 
Bankr. L.J. 349, 353 (1992) (noting that, In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs. L.P., 96 B.R. 24, 
29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), the first reported case to deal directly with break-up fees, 
used principles of corporate law to determine whether the break-up fee in question was 
valid). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See Rhett Frimet, The Birth of Bankruptcy in the United States, 96 Com. L.J. 
160, 160 (1991) (noting that one of the primary objectives of “all bankruptcy law” is 
“to prevent on the part of the insolvent debtor conduct detrimental to the interests of 
[its] creditors”); see, e.g., Matter of Midway Airlines, Inc., 6 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 
1993) (noting that “one of the Code’s central purposes” is “the maximization of the 
value of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of creditors”). 
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the best interests of the estate test, and the administrative expense test.18 
Thus, at the outset it is imperative that courts come to a consensus with 
respect to an appropriate standard of review. Congress designed the 
Bankruptcy Code19 to provide a uniform framework under which entities 
can operate while insolvent. 20  The lack of a uniform break-up fee 
standard is detrimental to that principle and leaves debtors and stalking 
horse bidders in a precarious position.21 
Courts and scholars advocating for a particular standard have used 
statistical analysis, economic theory, and principles of law to defend 
their respective positions. However, few have analyzed this issue in a 
manner that goes beyond the general purpose of bankruptcy law and 
toward the specific nuances of Chapter 11.22 Since bankruptcy law, at its 
core, is based in principles of equity, it only makes sense to develop a 
theory of break-up fees based in the philosophies underlying its 
procedures. Therefore, this Note does not arrive at its position via 
empirical evidence, but rather, its conclusion is based on an overview of 
the shifting function of § 363 sales in Chapter 11 bankruptcy.23 
This Note argues in favor of using the best interests of the estate 
test when determining whether to award break-up fees to stalking horse 
bidders in § 363 sales. Part I begins with a brief overview of § 363 sales 
in bankruptcy, focusing specifically on the role of the stalking horse 
bidder. Part II discusses break-up fees and the three main standards that 
bankruptcy courts use when determining whether to award break-up fees 
to a stalking horse bidder. Finally, Part III argues in favor of the best 
interests of the estate test as the appropriate standard of review, which 
                                                                                                                 
 18. 2 William L. Norton, Jr., Norton Bankruptcy Law & Practice § 44:27 (3d ed. 
2010). 
 19. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2012) (containing the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code). 
 20. See Maryland Port Admin. v. Premier Auto. Services, Inc. (In re Premier Auto. 
Servs., Inc.), 492 F.3d 274, 284 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The purpose of Chapter 11 
reorganization is to assist financially distressed business enterprises by providing them 
with breathing space in which to return to a viable state.”) (quotations omitted) 
(citations omitted). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (2012) (containing the provisions of 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
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represents a strong middle ground between the three approaches and is 
implicated by § 363’s role in modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
I. § 363 SALES AND THE STALKING HORSE BIDDER 
A debtor can pursue two avenues when selling significant assets of 
its business in bankruptcy. 24  The debtor can use § 1123 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which involves the oft lengthy process of developing 
a plan of reorganization and having it confirmed by the court. 25 
Alternatively, the debtor can use § 363(b), which permits the debtor to 
sell assets outside of the ordinary course of business subject to the 
procedures set forth in the Bankruptcy Code.26 Typically, § 363 sales 
happen fast and via public auction, and therefore are more prone to 
being targeted by distressed asset investors.27 Consequently, the issue of 
break-up fees is far more prevalent in the context of § 363 sales as 
opposed to plan sales.28 This part discusses § 363 sales and the role of 
the stalking horse bidder in § 363 sales conducted via public auction. 
A. § 363 SALES: AN OVERVIEW 
In the modern bankruptcy world many debtors opt to sell assets via 
§ 363 as opposed to a traditional Chapter 11 plan.29 Section 363 permits 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Rakhee V. Patel & Vickie L. Driver, Toto, I’ve A Feeling We’re Not in 
Kansas Anymore: Bankruptcy Sales Outside the Ordinary Course of Business, 57 Fed. 
Law. 56, 56 (2010) (discussing § 1123 versus § 363 for sales outside of the ordinary 
course of business). 
 25. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012). 
 26. See id. § 363. 
 27. See Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The Opportunity for 
Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 249, 269 
(2006) (noting that “the number of § 363 preplan sale motions for all or substantially all 
of the debtor’s assets dramatically increased in the 1990s and preplan sales enjoy even 
more use since 2000”). 
 28. See Kimberly W. Osenbaugh & David C. Neu, Asset Sales in Bankruptcy 
Break-Up Fees and Topping Fees, SJ076 ALI-ABA 829, 832 (2004) (noting that break-
up fees are often requested in § 363 sales as opposed to 1123 plans because “[s]ales of 
assets pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code are often conducted pursuant to 
sophisticated bidding procedures”). 
 29. Jacob A. Kling, Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 258, 262 
(2012) (noting the trend toward § 363 sales, and proffering that two possible 
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a debtor to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business, prior to a 
confirmed plan of reorganization, following notice and hearing, and 
upon approval of the court.30 The shift from a traditional Chapter 11 
case, one which would have the debtor’s assets disposed pursuant to a 
confirmed plan of reorganization, to § 363 sales, “has been driven by 
efficiency, from the perspectives of sellers and buyers alike.” 31  A 
significant impetus for this trend is the speed of a § 363 sale, which “can 
maximize asset value by sale of the debtor’s business as a going 
concern.”32 In addition, § 363 sales tend to enhance the purchase price of 
the distressed asset because they are sold to the purchaser free and clear 
of all liens, claims, and liabilities under § 363(f). 33  Furthermore, § 
363(m) limits the ability to appeal a § 363 sale to a “good faith” 
purchaser.34 These two provisions, “provide a degree of finality to the 
sale that is very appealing to prospective purchasers.”35 As a result, 
debtors are able to receive a higher price for the sale as buyers jump on 
the opportunity to receive distressed assets at a discount while receiving 
the protections of the Bankruptcy Code.36 
Recently, “it has become more commonplace for debtors to hold § 
363 sales with the purpose of selling substantially all of their assets.”37 
In effect, bankrupt corporations are using § 363 as a way of selling their 
businesses while foregoing the traditional Chapter 11 process.38 Debtors 
can execute § 363 sales by private or public auction,39 although, in order 
                                                                                                                 
explanations are: “that a 363 sale can be accomplished more quickly and at less cost 
than a full blown reorganization . . . [,] [and] assets have become less firm specific; as a 
result, a firm’s going concern surplus can generally be preserved as effectively through 
a 363 sale as through a reorganization”). 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012). 
 31. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC), 576 F.3d 
108, 115 (2d Cir. 2009) vacated on other grounds In re Chrysler, LLC, 592 F.3d 370 
(2d Cir. 2010). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 115-16; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012). 
 34. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m). 
 35. Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of A Section § 
363 Sale, 30-FEB Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 48, 48 (2011). 
 36. Kling, supra note 29, at 263 (noting the functions of a § 363 sale to “offer an 
important and efficient mechanism to maximize the value of the estate”). 
 37. Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 35, at 48 (emphasis in original). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004f)(1). 
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to maximize value for the estate, major assets are rarely sold at private 
auctions.40 Generally, sale through public auction involves selecting an 
initial bidder to begin the process and then sending the sale to auction 
where competing bidders can drive up the sale price. 41  The role, 
necessity, and treatment of the initial bidder in § 363 sales have become 
increasingly debated topics in bankruptcy.42 
B. THE STALKING HORSE BIDDER 
The initial bidder plays an important role in the § 363 sale 
process.43 This bidder will negotiate the purchase agreement with the 
debtor, and the debtor will ultimately use that purchase agreement as the 
vehicle through which the sale will be consummated at auction.44 In 
bankruptcy, practitioners typically refer to the initial bidder as the 
stalking horse bidder.45 The term “stalking horse” refers to a tactic used 
in hunting whereby a hunter conceals himself behind an image of a 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Harvey R. Miller, John J. Rapisardi, & Reginald A. Greene, Leaving Old 
Questions Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers the New 
Value Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. 203 North 
Lasalle Street Partnership, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 553, 565 (2000) (noting that “major 
assets are rarely sold at private auctions”). 
 41. See Deutsch & Distefano, supra note 35, at 49 (noting that “[t]he first step of a 
§ 363 sale is often for the debtor to identify a ‘stalking horse’ bidder” who will 
establish the floor price of the assets, “which can be shopped around to other potential 
bidders”). 
 42. See, e.g., Oscar Garza, Jesse S. Finlayson, & Solmaz Hamidian, Rethinking the 
Scope of the O’Brien Decision: Why the Third Circuit’s Administrative Claims Analysis 
Should Not Be Applied to the Debtor’s Request for Approval of A Breakup Fee in 
Connection with Bankruptcy Sales in Chapter 11 Cases, 28 Cal. Bankr. J. 1, 2 (2005) 
(criticizing the Third Circuit’s use of the administrative expense test to review a break-
up fee); see e.g., Markell, supra note 15 (arguing against allowing break-up fees in 
bankruptcy). 
 43. See Blain, supra note 11, at 8 (“While some sales proceed as ‘naked auctions’ 
with no stalking horse bids, these are relatively rare.”). 
 44. See generally Sharon Alexander, Bankruptcy Sales: The Stalking Horse, JONES 
DAY, Nov. 2003, at 2-3, available at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/ 
pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S2177 (explaining bidding procedures and describing 
incentives for the stalking horse). 
 45. David H. Kleiman, Alternatives for Awarding Break-Up Fees to Stalking-
Horse Bidders, 29-OCT Am. Bankr. Inst. J., 26, 26 (2010) (citation omitted). 
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horse in order to get closer to his target.46 Analogously, the debtor in a § 
363 sale uses the stalking horse bidder to stimulate the bidding process 
and draw other bidders into the sale. 47  The stalking horse performs 
extensive due diligence and typically drafts the asset purchase 
agreement used to consummate the sale.48 Ultimately, the stalking horse 
sets the floor for the deal by determining the value of the debtor’s 
assets.49 During this process, the stalking horse will generally expend far 
more resources than other bidders when trying to secure the deal 
because subsequent bidders can rely on the stalking horse’s due 
diligence when crafting their own bids.50 
It may seem unlikely that a purchaser would volunteer to serve as a 
stalking horse given the nature of the job. 51  Nevertheless, there are 
several reasons why a potential purchaser would assume the role.52 First, 
the role of the stalking horse puts the potential purchaser in the best 
position to structure a favorable deal.53 In addition to developing the 
financial terms of the purchase agreement, the stalking horse can also 
negotiate favorable bidding procedures that will enhance its ability to 
close the sale.54 Second, oftentimes a debtor will offer certain bidding 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Blain, supra note 11, at 10. 
 49. See Brown, supra note 4, at 1465 (discussing the issues a stalking horse bidder 
faces when setting the floor for a deal). 
 50. Monica E. White, Give Me A Break-Up Fee: In Re Reliant Energy 
Channelview LP and the Third Circuit’s Improper Rejection of a Bankruptcy Bid 
Protection Provision, 48 Hous. L. Rev. 659, 668 (2011) (noting that subsequent bidders 
can rely on the stalking horse’s due diligence and therefore incur less costs). 
 51. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that “[p]otential purchasers may be 
reluctant to the take on the role of the stalking horse” given that the “initial bidder 
typically has to expend greater resources than other bidders in negotiating the deal, 
performing due diligence, and otherwise setting the ‘floor’ for the terms of the 
transaction). 
 52. See Osenbaugh & Neu, supra note 28, at 833-36 (discussing the variety of 
reasons why a potential purchaser would agree to become the stalking horse). 
 53. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“Another significant benefit available to the 
stalking horse bidder is the ability to influence the sale process. . . . By custom, the 
stalking horse bidder usually drafts the asset purchase agreement used in connection 
with the transaction. . . . A stalking horse bidder that may be willing to assume various 
contracts or exclude certain assets may be able to craft an asset purchase agreement that 
gives it a competitive advantage over other buyers.”). 
 54. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2. 
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incentives to solicit a potential purchaser to become the stalking horse.55 
Two of the most common compensatory bidding incentives are expense 
reimbursements and break-up fees. 56  Under expense reimbursement 
arrangements, the debtor will reimburse the stalking horse for 
reasonable fees incurred with respect to the stalking horse’s due 
diligence.57 The amount and timing of the reimbursement will generally 
be limited in order to ensure that the bankruptcy court does not perceive 
it as an unreasonable drain on the debtor’s estate.58 Break-up fees, on the 
other hand, represent compensation paid to the stalking horse unrelated 
to any costs incurred.59 This distinction has led to courts and scholars 
disagreeing as to how to classify and analyze break-up fees in 
bankruptcy.60 
II. BREAK-UP FEES 
In its most basic form, a break-up fee is a predetermined amount 
payable to one party if an agreed upon transaction with another party 
fails to close.61 In an auction context, a break-up fee compensates an 
unsuccessful bidder through a payment that goes beyond covering the 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“[U]sually a number of interested parties 
vigorously seek to become the stalking horse because of the significant benefits that 
flow from that status.”). 
 56. Id. (“Among the most significant benefits that accrue to the stalking horse is 
the ability to receive a break-up fee and/or reimbursement of expenses.”). 
 57. Id. (“Expense reimbursement is the reimbursement of actual expenses the 
stalking horse can prove it expended in connection with the transaction.”). 
 58. See Alexander, supra note 44, at 2 (commenting that bidding incentives often 
include “expense reimbursements, break-up fees, favorable bidding procedures, and 
exclusivity arrangements”). 
 59. See Blain, supra note 11, at 9 (“A true break-up fee is a fixed number paid if 
the stalking horse is not the successful bidder, without regard to the actual expenses 
incurred by the stalking horse.”). 
 60. See e.g., Markell, supra note 15. Compare In re Reliant Energy Channelview 
LP, 594 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing the break-up fee using the 
administrative expense standard) with In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1995) (analyzing the break-up fee using the best interests of the estate test). 
 61. Simon M. Lorne & Joey Marlene Bryan, Acquisitions and Mergers: Negotiated 
and Contested Transactions, in 11 Acquisitions & Mergers § 3:62 (2014). 
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bidder’s pre-sale expenses.62 In a simple scenario, one company makes 
an offer to buy a target entity, and the offer is accepted.63 The two 
entities finalize “the terms of the acquisition, but prior to the closing of 
the transaction, a third company offers a higher offer for the target 
company” that the target company ultimately accepts.64 In this scenario, 
the original offeror has taken the time to set up the deal yet ends up 
receiving nothing in return. To mitigate this risk, the initial bidder will 
request that the target entity stipulate to pay a fee to the initial bidder in 
the event that the transaction is not consummated.65 This way, the initial 
bidder guarantees itself compensation for the resources expended while 
valuing the target entity and formulating an appropriate offer.66 Given 
the modern propensity for strategic acquisitions both in and out of 
bankruptcy, the issue of break-up fees has become a frequent topic of 
debate among courts and scholars.67 
A. NON-BANKRUPTCY BREAK-UP FEES 
Judicial examination of break-up fees first developed in non-
bankruptcy law. 68  Parties often negotiate break-up fees as part of 
corporate merger and acquisition transactions. 69  When considering a 
potential merger or acquisition, the acquiring company will spend “time, 
effort, and capital in order to determine such factors as corporate 
compatibility and economic feasibility.”70 Given the complexity of many 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Brown, supra note 4, at 1465 (“The break-up fee compensates the unsuccessful 
initial bidder through a fee greater than the initial bidder’s actual due diligence 
expenses.”). 
 63. Ely R. Levy, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy 
Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1361, 1366-67 (2002). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1367. 
 66. Id. at 1366 (noting that initial bidders spend “a great deal of time and capital in 
the process of appraising the target entity for the purpose of formulating an accurate bid 
or offer”). 
 67. See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
 68. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.17 (“The concept of a break-up fee in a section 
363 sale originally derives from non-bankruptcy case law.”). 
 69. Id. (commenting that “break-up fees are routinely seen in acquisition 
transactions throughout the corporate world”). 
 70. Levy, supra note 63, at 1402. 
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of these transactions, the initial bidder may end up investing substantial 
financial resources toward due diligence efforts and preparation of its 
offer or bid. 71  In addition to the considerable up-front costs, the 
competitive nature of the modern corporate landscape further increases 
the risk to the potential bidder.72 Making matters more challenging for 
the parties in interest is the requirement that corporate shareholders 
approve most major corporate combinations.73 Because shareholders in 
public companies are often numerous and widely dispersed, this 
approval requirement can significantly delay the closing of the 
transaction. 74  This allows competitors time to use the information 
gathered by the initial bidder and make a competing bid with potentially 
better terms.75 The initial bidder may end up losing out on the deal if the 
shareholders approve an alternative offer, 76  leaving the bidder 
uncompensated for the tremendous costs of investigating the 
transaction. 77  In addition to the sunk costs, the bidder incurs the 
opportunity cost of not profiting from another strategic merger.78 
The increasing trend of corporate combination transactions 79 
coupled with the substantial risk of losing a deal to a rival bidder80 have 
caused break-up fees to become a commonplace deal provision in 
                                                                                                                 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1370 n.47 (noting that “in the current merger 
landscape, large corporations have been using mergers to gain advantage within their 
industries”) (citing Constance L. Hays, Unilever Deal for Bestfoods Signals More 
Acquisitions, N.Y. Times, June 7, 2000, at C1). 
 73. See Markell, supra note 15, at 353 (“Acquirers often ask for breakup fees due 
to the requirement that corporate shareholders must approve most major corporate 
combinations.”). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. at 353 (concluding that, in effect, “the breakup fee is designed . . . to 
compensate for the risk of losing a [finished] deal”). 
 79. See Richard G. Parker & David A. Balto, The Merger Wave: Trends in Merger 
Enforcement and Litigation, 55 Bus. Law. 351, 356 (1999) (noting this trend). 
 80. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1370 n.51 (noting that second bidders prevailed in 
75% of the forty-eight acquisition cases examined) (citing Richard S. Ruback, 
Assessing Competition in the Market for Corporate Acquisitions, 11 J. Part Fin. Econ. 
141, 147 (1983)). 
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corporate merger and acquisition deals.81 As with many issues that arise 
in corporate law, courts evaluate break-up fees under the “business 
judgment rule.” 82  The business judgment rule operates under the 
“presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”83 
As discussed infra, judicial scrutiny under the business judgment rule 
differs slightly between the corporate and bankruptcy contexts, yet the 
overarching premise is the same.84 The rule requires courts to defer to 
the business judgment of corporate directors regarding the affairs of the 
corporate enterprise. 85  Under the rule, courts will not interfere with 
decisions that fall within corporate directors’ discretion in the absence of 
bad faith, negligence, or self-dealing.86 It is important to note, however, 
that some courts consider additional factors when analyzing the 
legitimacy of break-up fees in corporate combinations, namely, whether 
the break-up fee “enhance[s] rather than stop[s] bidding.” 87  This 
addition to the otherwise relatively unmodified use of the business 
                                                                                                                 
 81. See id. at 1363 n.16 (“[T]here’s little debate these days over break-up fees. 
When lawyers sit down to negotiate, everyone at the table pretty much knows what’s 
going to happen . . . Every buyer expects to get it, and every seller expects for it to be 
asked for.”) (citation omitted). 
 82. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-75 (11th Cir. 
1988); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 
1986) (using the business judgment rule to evaluate a target corporation’s assent to a 
break-up fee provision in the acquisition agreement). 
 83. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)), overruled on other grounds 
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 84. See infra Part II. 
 85. 3A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corp. § 1036 (2014). 
 86. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 479 (“A plaintiff challenging the business 
judgment of the board of directors bears the burden of proving bad faith, negligence, or 
self-dealing.”) (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)), overruled 
by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). 
 87. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422, 440 (noting 
in its analysis that break-up fees in corporate combinations “are not illegal where they 
enhance rather than chill bidding”); see also, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington 
Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“In coordinating the bidding 
process, the board can institute strategies, such as . . . a break-up fee . . . but only if their 
strategies enhance the bidding.”). 
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judgment rule highlights the controversial nature of break-up fees as 
they apply to judicially reviewable transactions.88 
B. BREAK-UP FEES IN BANKRUPTCY 
Despite break-up fees’ relatively new role in asset purchases in 
bankruptcy, they have come to the forefront of judicial debate, and for 
good reason.89 Procedurally, break-up fees in bankruptcy are similar to 
their corporate counterparts. 90  The fees are a payment made by the 
debtor to the proposed purchaser “in the event that the transaction 
contemplated fails to be consummated for various reasons delineated in 
the purchase agreement, including the [debtor’s] acceptance of a later 
bid.”91 Although similar in structure, break-up fees in bankruptcy asset 
sales, particularly § 363 sales, are far more nuanced than those that 
occur in corporate combinations.92 
The reasons why a potential § 363 purchaser would insist on break-
up fees are similar to the reasons traditionally used to justify break-up 
fees in corporate combinations, although potential purchasers arguably 
have even more incentive to pursue break-up fees in bankruptcy, given 
the heightened stakes. 93  As in corporate combinations, the potential 
purchaser will incur many expenses in negotiating the sale.94 However, 
because the subjects of § 363 transactions are distressed assets, 
oftentimes initial bidders will spend more time and money conducting 
due diligence as compared to a non-distressed acquisition.95  Broadly 
speaking, the debtor’s distressed situation may have encouraged its 
                                                                                                                 
 88. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Markell, supra note 15, at 354 (discussing the first reported bankruptcy 
case to address the issue of break-up fees, In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs. L.P., 96 B.R. 24 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 90. See Levy, supra note 63, at 1390 (“While termination fee provisions originated 
in the context of corporate mergers and acquisitions, such fees are included in 
bankruptcy asset purchase agreements.”). 
 91. In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 92. See infra notes 192-199 and accompanying text. 
 93. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 494 (“When a firm makes a decision to invest 
time and money in one project, it must forgo another because the firm’s resources are 
limited and it cannot invest in everything it might like.”). 
 94. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 95. Brown, supra note 4, at 1480 (“Initial bidders argue that they need [break-up 
fees] in order to justify researching and bidding for risky bankrupt companies.”). 
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management to take aggressive or atypical measures, particularly with 
regard to the business’ working capital, expenditures, and 
maintenance.96 As opposed to a healthy corporate combination, in which 
a buyer may want to purchase the target entity as a going concern, a 
distressed situation encourages buyers to sift through the debtor’s assets 
and choose the ones most likely to be profitable in the future.97 From a 
contractual standpoint, the seller will be unlikely or unable to stipulate 
to post-closing indemnifications for the buyer with respect to breaches 
of representations and warranties.98 As such, thorough due diligence will 
be critical for the buyer in order to formulate an offer that corresponds 
with these post-closing risks. 
In addition, a sensible initial bidder must always be concerned that 
the debtor will use the first bid as a stalking horse to attract other 
bidders.99 During the time it takes to garner court approval of the sale, 
the stalking horse runs the risk that a competing bidder will use the due 
diligence conducted by the stalking horse, make a superior bid, and win 
court approval.100 Making matters more difficult for the stalking horse is 
the fact that creditors can legitimately object to a § 363 sale if there is a 
higher or better offer.101 The considerable uncertainty as to whether the 
initial bidder will ultimately close the § 363 sale combined with the risks 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Ball & Kane, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that “the”[t]he seller’s distressed 
situation may have caused its management to take aggressive or unusual measures in 
operating the business, such as using working capital in peculiar ways or deferring 
maintenance or capital expenditures”). 
 97. See Corinne Ball & John K. Kane, A Practical Guide to Distress M&A (Part 
2), 6 M & A Law, no. 7-8, 2003 at 1, 6, available at http://www.jonesday.com/ 
files/Publication/7caf39ca-b5af-4018-8005-a438b96635c9/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/021f5fce-5fac-422d-8230-7e08207af727/GuideToDistress.pdf 
(“Unlike a conventional M&A transaction, in which a buyer may be pressured to buy a 
particular business or company as a going concern, warts and all, a distress situation 
may permit buyers to pick and choose assets, liabilities and contractual obligations.”). 
 98. See id. (noting that “post-closing indemnification for breaches of 
representations and warranties will not be available” and thus are unlikely to occur in 
Chapter 11 sales). In addition, if a debtor sells all or substantially all of its assets it will 
generally end all operations and cease to exist upon consummation of the Chapter 11 
proceeding. Consequently, there often may not be a post-closing entity from which the 
buyer can be reimbursed. 
 99. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.8-9 and accompanying text. 
 100. Id. at n.3 and accompanying text. 
 101. Id. at n.156 and accompanying text. 
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inherent to the acquisition of distressed assets strongly encourages 
potential § 363 bidders to seek break-up fees. 
While it seems as though only a stalking horse bidder would pursue 
break-up fees when entering into a § 363 sale, many scholars and courts 
argue that break-up fees are useful for the bankrupt entity as well.102 
There are a variety of legitimate reasons why a debtor would stipulate to 
a break-up fee.103 First, the break-up fee can serve to attract an initial 
bid. 104  Without the promise of guaranteed compensation, a potential 
purchaser may be hesitant to conduct the due diligence required to value 
the bankrupt company properly.105 As a corollary, the assurance of a 
break-up fee may help establish a high bidding floor early on in the 
process.106 Moreover, debtors use the initial bid to lure other bidders into 
the auction because later bidders can rely on the due diligence 
conducted by the stalking horse. 107  Therefore, the initial bid may 
ultimately attract higher subsequent bids during the auction process.108 
The delicate nature of break-up fees in § 363 sales is due to the 
competing interests present in bankruptcy. The overarching impediment 
is that one side of the deal does not simply constitute the assets of a 
seller, but rather, the assets of the estate of a debtor.109 The bankruptcy 
court must approve any transaction outside the ordinary course of 
business, which can make finalizing the sale precarious for all parties 
involved.110 Here, the court must approve the break-up fee and terms of 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 478 (“The reasons that a bankrupt corporation 
may want to enter into a break-up fee agreement are less obvious but no less 
legitimate.”). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Contra Markell, supra note 15, at 360-63 (arguing that break-up fees are not 
necessary to induce a healthy bidding process). 
 106. In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 107. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 478 (noting that once the initial bid has been 
submitted, other bidders “may become more willing to enter the bidding process 
because they can rely on the due diligence conducted by the initial bidder”). 
 108. See In re APP Plus, Inc., 223 B.R. at 874. (discussing the seller’s rationale in 
requesting break-up and topping fees). 
 109. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2012) (providing the DIP or the debtor’s trustee 
with the power to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, 
property of the estate) (emphasis added). 
 110. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (requiring court approval of any transaction, sales or 
leases outside of the ordinary course of business). 
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the purchase agreement, but more importantly, the court must approve 
the use of a § 363 sale by the debtor.111 In this regard, the court must 
take into account not only the position of the stalking horse and the 
debtor, but also the interests of the estate, which includes the interests of 
the estate’s creditors.112 Courts faced with the decision of whether to 
approve a break-up fee have to weigh these interests when choosing 
which standard of review to employ, as there is no explicit guidance in 
the Bankruptcy Code. 113  Left to their own interpretations, courts in 
different circuits have utilized varying standards of review based on 
several rationales and factors.114 Currently, the courts use three main 
standards when deciding whether to authorize a break-up fee for a 
stalking horse bidder: (1) the business judgment rule, (2) the best 
interests of the estate test, and (3) the administrative expense standard.115 
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE  
With break-up fees roots entrenched in corporate law, it is hardly 
surprising that early bankruptcy courts looked to corporate law for 
guidance as to how to review such fees.116 In a case of first impression, 
In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, the Supreme Court determined that 
the principles underlying the business judgment rule were appropriate in 
the Chapter 11 context. 117  Accordingly, the Court followed the 
traditional approach towards break-up fees in corporate law, using the 
business judgment rule in combination with other factors to determine 
the validity of the fee.118 The court noted that, in the corporate context, 
                                                                                                                 
 111. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that bankruptcy courts will require a “sound 
business purpose” for the use of § 363, including a showing that a non-plan sale is 
justified). 
 112. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 481. 
 113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 114. See infra Part II.B.1-3. 
 115. See supra note 114. 
 116. See, e.g., In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., 96 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(noting with respect to break-up fees, that corporate “principles have vitality by analogy 
in the chapter 11 context”) (internal citations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 28. 
 118. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-79 (11th Cir. 
1988); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422, 436-39 (S.D.N.Y. 
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break-up fees are generally acceptable where they enhance, rather than 
chill, bidding and are reasonable in relation to the bidder’s efforts and 
magnitude of the transaction.119 Finding both of these prongs satisfied, 
the Court determined that the business judgment rule encouraged the 
Court to defer to the debtor’s business judgment as there was no 
evidence of “self-dealing, fraud or bad faith . . . [n]or [was] any claim 
made that the auction was somehow tainted by unfair dealing.”120 
The business judgment standard, insofar as it relates to break-up 
fees in bankruptcy, has been refined since In re 995 Fifth Avenue 
Associates. 121  The touchstone case concerning use of the business 
judgment rule to evaluate the validity of break-up fees in bankruptcy 
comes from the Second Circuit.122 In In re Integrated Resources Inc., the 
court, relying on prior district court decisions, formulated the modified 
business judgment rule for assessing the validity of break-up fees, 
asking: “whether (1) the negotiations leading to the break-up fee were 
the result of an arms-length transaction, (2) the fee encourages bidding 
and (3) the amount of the fee is reasonable in light of the prospective 
purchase price.”123 Courts have altered the specific prongs of the test in 
certain instances, but the guiding principle for the business judgment 
approach remains constant: avoid interfering with a debtor’s business 
decisions absent a clear manifestation of bad faith or breach of fiduciary 
duty.124 Thus, courts that employ the business judgment standard are far 
                                                                                                                 
1988); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 623-26 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 119. See In re 995 Fifth Ave Assocs., 96 B.R. at 28 (“In the corporate takeover 
context it is recognized that breakup fees are not illegal where they enhance rather than 
hamper the bidding. . . . When reasonable in relation to the bidder’s efforts and to the 
magnitude of the transaction, breakup fees are generally permissible.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 120. Id. at 28-29. 
 121. See infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text. 
 122. See In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
 123. Kleiman, supra note 45, at 90 (citing In re Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. at 
658). 
 124. See, e.g., Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 574-75 (11th Cir. 
1988) (noting that the business judgment rule “protects the defendants from liability 
absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion”). 
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more likely to award break-up fees for the stalking horse bidder than 
courts using alternative standards.125 
There are many courts and scholars that have criticized bankruptcy 
courts’ use of the business judgment rule for break-up fees.126 Many of 
these critics believe that a court’s primary goal when overseeing a 
bankruptcy asset sale should be to maximize the value of the sale for the 
benefit of the estate.127 This concern has led many to argue that courts 
should not provide a debtor with the deference of the business judgment 
rule because parties to a non-bankruptcy corporate combination are 
unconcerned with the interests of creditors. 128  Those embracing this 
school of thought believe that corporate standards are inappropriate for 
assessing bid protection mechanisms in bankruptcy. 129  Instead, there 
“should be an extra layer of consideration for the interests of creditors . . 
. not present in a corporate transaction between two fully solvent 
parties.”130 
D. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE TEST 
Instead of using the business judgment standard, some circuits have 
refashioned their approach to draw on bankruptcy-inspired rules for the 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Compare In re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. 813 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (approving a 
break-up fee under the business judgment rule), aff’d sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC, 
650 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011) and In re Metaldyne Corp., 409 B.R. 661 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (same), with In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d 200 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
break-up fee under the administrative expense standard), and In re Beth Israel Hosp. 
Ass’n of Passaic, No. 06-16186, 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 12, 2007) 
(denying the break-up fee under the administrative expense standard). 
 126. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (noting that with respect to the use of 
the business judgment rule in § 363 sales, “it makes little sense blindly to adopt 
corporate rules for bankruptcy transactions”). 
 127. See, e.g., In re Atlanta Packaging Prods., Inc., 99 B.R. 124, 131 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 1988) (“It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that the objective of 
bankruptcy sales and the trustee’s duty with respect to such sales is to obtain the highest 
price or greatest overall benefit possible for the estate.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (arguing against the use of the business 
judgment rule for break-up fees in bankruptcy because, inter alia, “[t]he increased level 
of protection for creditors’ priority claims gives rise to an increased level of obligation 
and duty on the part of those who negotiate bankruptcy asset sales”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See White, supra note 50, at 678. 
480 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
evaluation break-up fees.131 This prominent standard of review focuses 
on the “best interests of the estate.”132 Courts applying the test do not 
focus on “whether a breakup fee is within the business judgment of the 
debtor, but whether the transaction will further the diverse interests of 
the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike.”133 
Under the best interests of the estate test, courts use a broader 
approach that focuses on whether the implementation of the break-up 
fee maximizes the value of the sale for the estate’s creditors.134 While 
courts consider different circumstances when employing the best 
interests of the estate test, some factors that are generally considered are: 
(1) whether the bid is higher than it would have been had the break-up 
fee not been granted; (2) whether the break-up fee provided net value to 
the estate; (3) whether a break-up fee is necessary to start the bidding 
process; and (4) whether the amount of the break-up fee is small relative 
to the overall benefit of the estate.135 Courts embracing the best interests 
philosophy are willing to award break-up fees; however, many courts 
using the best interests standard place a high burden on the stalking 
horse bidder to validate the fee.136 
Despite representing a middle ground between the business 
judgment rule and the administrative expense standard, the best interests 
                                                                                                                 
 131. See, e.g., In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (“This 
Court agrees with America West that the proper standard for evaluating a breakup fee 
should be whether the interests of all concerned parties are best served by such a fee. 
The test is whether the payment of a breakup fee is in the best interests of the estate.”). 
 132. Id. at 103. 
 133. Id. at 104-05 (internal quotations omitted). 
 134. See id. (noting that the question to consider when approving a break-up fee “is 
not whether a break-up fee is within the business judgment of the debtor, but whether 
the transaction will further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity 
holders, alike”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 135. See In re Tama Beef Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90, 97 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003); In 
re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997); In re Am. W. 
Airlines Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912-13 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). 
 136. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. at 105 (noting that, “absent compelling 
circumstances which clearly indicate that payment of the fee would be in the best 
interests of the estate, breakup fees should not be awarded in bankruptcy auction 
sales”); see, e.g., In re Tiara Motorcoach, 212 B.R. at 137 (using the best interests of 
the estate test and denying the stalking horse bidder’s request for a break-up fee); but 
see In re Sea Island Co., 10-21034, 2010 WL 4393269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 15, 2010) 
(approving the break-up fee under the best interests of the estate test). 
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of the estate test is not without its detractors. 137  Among the chief 
concerns surrounding the best interests of the estate test is its fluidity.138 
Although individual courts have articulated factors that they believe 
should be considered in the analysis,139 there has been no version of the 
test that provides finite elements by which judges can evaluate the 
legitimacy of the fee request.140 Many critics argue that the discretion 
afforded to bankruptcy judges by the best interests of the estate test 
leads to inconsistent results.141 
E. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE STANDARD—§ 503(b) 
Notably, the Third Circuit is the only circuit in which a court of 
appeals has addressed the issue of break-up fees for stalking horse 
bidders.142 The court of appeals for the Third Circuit had the opportunity 
to choose a side in the developing dichotomy of bankruptcy break-up 
fee jurisprudence in the 1999 case, In re O’Brien Environmental Energy 
Inc. 143  Instead of aligning with the pre-existing positions, the Third 
Circuit decided that none of the case law advocating for use of the 
business judgment standard or the best interests of the estate test 
“offer[ed] a compelling justification for treating an application for 
break-up fees and expenses under § 503(b) differently from other 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See e.g., McGrath, supra note 7, part C (“[W]ithout some evidence that the 
board has breached its duty to maximize the value of its bankruptcy estate a bankruptcy 
court should review a presale request of a break-up fee under the well-established 
modified business judgment standard.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1478 (“Although the In re Lionel Corp. court 
pioneered the Best Interest Standard by instructing judges to consider the impact of the 
break-up fee upon all stakeholders, it failed to provide judges with definite factors to 
help guide judges in their evaluation.”). 
 139. See, e.g., In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) 
(listing seven factors to be used in the analysis). 
 140. See, e.g., In re Tiara Motorcoach, 212 B.R. at 137-38; In re Am. W. Airlines 
Inc., 166 B.R. 908 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994). 
 141. See e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1477-84 (advocating for a change to the best 
interests of the estate test that provides judges with specific factors to assess). 
 142. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 7. 
 143. See Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Envtl. 
Energy, Inc.), 181 F.3d 527, 533 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The bankruptcy courts and district 
courts that have addressed the standard for break-up fees and expenses in bankruptcy 
proceedings have adopted [two] very different approaches.”). 
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applications for administrative expenses under the same provision.”144 
The Court went on to conclude that “the determination whether break-up 
fees or expenses are allowable under § 503(b) must be made in reference 
to general administrative expense jurisprudence.”145 
Under the administrative expense standard, a break-up fee is 
justifiable (like other administrative expenses), if the requesting party 
can show that the fees were “actual” and “necessary” to preserve the 
value of the estate. 146  To assess whether the break-up satisfies this 
standard, courts have considered two primary questions:147 (1) whether 
the break-up fee was necessary to induce the stalking horse’s bid; and 
(2) whether the break-up fee was necessary to preserve the stalking 
horse’s bid at auction.148 In answering these questions, In re O’Brien and 
its progeny have not been inclined to award break-up fees. 149  For 
instance, in the recent case In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, the 
court declined the stalking horse’s request for a break-up fee under the 
administrative expense standard, despite the fact that the majority of 
creditors and the “sole affected shareholder” of the debtor supported 
approval of the break-up fee.150 
                                                                                                                 
 144. Id. at 535. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). 
 147. However, it should also be noted that some courts have fleshed out these two 
factors further by listing specific criteria to be considered. This type of analysis is 
sometimes referred to as the “multi-factor 503(b) standard.” See, e.g., In re Tama Beef 
Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90, 97-98 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing nine factors to be 
considered in the break-up fee analysis and denying the stalking horse’s request for a 
break-up fee). 
 148. White, supra note 50, at 666 (citing In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 
F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
 149. See, e.g., In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 210 (holding that 
the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the break-up fee); In re 
Tama Beef Packing, Inc., 290 B.R. 90 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the bankruptcy 
court’s denial of the break-up fee); In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (affirming the district court’s decision to deny the break-up fee); In re Beth 
Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, 06-16186 (NLW), 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 
12, 2007) (denying the plaintiff’s request for a break-up fee). 
 150. In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 203, 209; see also In re Beth 
Israel Hosp. Ass’n of Passaic, 06-16186 (NLW), 2007 WL 2049881 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 
12, 2007) (noting that “the fact that the Debtor agreed to the break-up fee and thought 
that it was reasonable and appropriate is not determinative of the allowance of such a 
fee as an administrative expense”). 
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The administrative expense standard’s hard stance towards 
awarding break-up fees has been met with criticism, especially from 
stalking horse bidders. At the outset, detractors believe that the 
standard’s heightened scrutiny deters potential bidders from assuming 
the role of the stalking horse.151 From a statutory perspective, those in 
opposition to the administrative expense standard contend that break-up 
fees are strikingly dissimilar from typical administrative expenses.152 
Indeed, some argue that break-up fees and § 503(b) administrative 
expenses are distinguishable because administrative expenses are 
supposed to be reimbursements or repayments to legislatively preferred 
creditors, while break-up fees, in their truest form, are compensatory 
sums that do not represent reimbursement for costs incurred.153 As such, 
critics believe that § 503(b) is an inappropriate method of reviewing 
break-up fees, as the statute only allows for “compensatory 
reimbursement” under nine specific situations which focus on expenses 
that are actual and necessary to preserving the value of the estate.154 
F. THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY 
The various approaches discussed above may each have advantages 
and disadvantages depending on one’s view of break-up fees. What is 
apparent from the analysis of the three approaches, however, is that the 
outcome of the break-up fee approval determination is intrinsically 
linked to which approach is taken by the court.155 A court’s decision to 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 45, at 89 (“[The administrative expense 
standard] may deter potential [stalking horse] bidders from incurring the time and 
expense needed to conduct due-diligence and prepare a bid for the asset.”). 
 152. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1475 (“Break-up fees and § 503(b) 
administrative expenses differ primarily in that administrative expenses are supposed to 
be reimbursements or repayments to legislatively preferred and designated creditors, 
while break-up fees are often excessive damages paid to outside and non-invested 
bidders who lose a later auction or fail to consummate a purchase agreement for some 
reason other than the fault of the stalking horse bidder.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2012); Brown, supra note 4, at 1476. 
 155. Compare In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a break-up fee under § 503), In re Reliant 
Energy Channelview, LP, 403 B.R. 308 (D. Del. 2009) (same), aff’d sub nom. In re 
Reliant Energy Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 210 (3d Cir. 2010), and In re Pub. Serv. 
Co. of New Hampshire, 160 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (denying an unsuccessful 
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use one approach over another can have a major effect on the ultimate 
outcome of the § 363 sale, from both the debtor’s and the stalking 
horse’s perspective.156 While some courts and scholars have argued that 
break-up fees have no place in § 363 sales at all,157 the discussion that 
follows will presume that, at least for the time being, stalking horse 
bidders will be entitled to request approval of a break-up fee 
arrangement. As such, courts must come to a consensus as to the 
appropriate standard of review for break-up fees in bankruptcy. 
The uncertainty surrounding break-up fees in § 363 sales can lead 
to unpredictable results in Chapter 11 cases where potential stalking 
horse bidders are unsure of whether the court will approve their request 
for a fee.158 The differing standards encourage parties to forum shop; 
specifically, they encourage potential purchasers to seek investment 
opportunities in jurisdictions using the more lenient business judgment 
                                                                                                                 
bidder’s claim for a break-up fee under § 503), with In re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R. 
746, 753, aff’d 147 B.R. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of 
the business judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 09-
21323, 2010 WL 4917553 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2010) (approving the break-up 
fee where the fee “constituted a fair and reasonable exercise of the debtor’s business 
judgment”), and In re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. 813 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (affirming the 
bankruptcy court’s use of the business judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), aff’d 
sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC, 650 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 156. Compare In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(affirming the bankruptcy court’s denial of a break-up fee under § 503), In re Reliant 
Energy Channelview, LP, 403 B.R. at 312 (same), aff’d sub nom. In re Reliant Energy 
Channelview LP, 594 F.3d at 200, and In re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 160 
B.R. 404 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1993) (denying an unsuccessful bidder’s claim for a break-up 
fee under § 503), with In re Integrated Res., Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 753 aff’d, 147 B.R. at 
664 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of the business judgment 
rule to approve a break-up fee), In re AmTrust Fin. Corp., 09-21323, 2010 WL 
4917553 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2010) (approving the break-up fee where the fee 
“constituted a fair and reasonable exercise of the debtor’s business judgment”), and In 
re ASARCO LLC, 441 B.R. at 833 (affirming the bankruptcy court’s use of the business 
judgment rule to approve a break-up fee), aff’d sub nom. In re ASARCO, LLC, 650 F.3d 
at 603 
 157. See e.g., Markell, supra note 15, at 386; In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 186 B.R. 98, 104 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that, “absent compelling circumstances which clearly 
indicate that payment of the fee would be in the best interests of the estate, breakup fees 
should not be awarded in bankruptcy auction sales”). 
 158. See Brown, supra note 4, at 1467 (“[T]he lack of a uniform standard leaves 
stalking horse bidders guessing whether bankruptcy judges will approve or deny their 
break-up fees . . . .”) (internal citation omitted). 
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rule. 159  Furthermore, the task of soliciting a qualified initial bidder 
seems daunting for a debtor that will not be able to speak definitively as 
to what bidding incentives it can offer. 160  Similarly, stalking horse 
bidders that have preliminarily agreed to submit a bid for assets in a § 
363 sale will be wary of how many resources to commit to the process if 
they are unsure of whether their rights to a break-up fee will be 
upheld. 161  Ultimately, this confusion can lengthen § 363 sale 
negotiations and detract from the value received for the assets.162 
III. BALANCING THE APPROACH 
Part II examined the three prominent approaches employed by 
bankruptcy courts when reviewing break-up fee requests and 
demonstrated the importance of establishing a uniform framework for 
making such a determination. This Part argues in favor of using the best 
interests of the estate test to determine whether to award break-up fees 
to stalking horse bidders. The best interests of the estate test represents a 
balanced approach implicated by the new role of § 363 sales in Chapter 
11. 
A. THE ROLE OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT IN CHAPTER 11 
Adversary proceedings aside, a bankruptcy judge’s primary role is 
to oversee the debtor’s estate and ensure that parties in interest comply 
with the bankruptcy procedures.163 Instead of a universal approach, the 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Courting Failure: How Competition for Big Cases Is 
Corrupting the Bankruptcy Courts 13-16 (Univ. of Michigan Press 2006) (noting that 
bankruptcy courts can and have solicited lucrative bankruptcy cases by using their 
discretion to make their jurisdiction appear more favorable for corporate bankruptcy 
filings). 
 160. See Hebbeln, supra note 13, at 505 (advocating for a uniform amendment to 
the Bankruptcy Code because “[p]arties” to break-up fee arrangements [in most 
bankruptcy courts] cannot know which line of reasoning their court will adopt” with 
respect to break-up fees). 
 161. Markell, supra note 15, at 375 (noting that stalking horse bidders anticipating 
strict review of their purchase agreement will lower their bid accordingly to compensate 
for the risk of losing the break-up fee). 
 162. See id. 
 163. Bruce M. Price, Halting, Altering and Agreeing, 38 S.U. L. Rev. 233, 243-44 
(2011) (“[T]he role of the judge in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case differs markedly from 
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Bankruptcy Code sets forth various frameworks for courts to employ 
depending on the type of case before the court.164 It seems unlikely that 
Congress would have fashioned alternative methods by which a debtor 
could enter bankruptcy if Congress did not in fact wish to differentiate 
the role of the bankruptcy court in each proceeding.165 It follows that a 
consideration of the level of scrutiny warranted by break-up fees 
necessarily entails an assessment of the role of the bankruptcy court in a 
Chapter 11 case. 
Generally, a debtor remains in control of its operations as a 
“debtor-in-possession” (“DIP”) in Chapter 11 cases.166 Unlike Chapter 7 
where a trustee is automatically appointed,167 a bankruptcy judge will 
only appoint a trustee in a Chapter 11 case when a party in interest can 
demonstrate a need for one.168 An analysis of the legislative history of 
Chapter 11 “explains that the primary reason for leaving the debtor in 
possession is that the continuation of experienced management will 
benefit both debtors and creditors by leading to a greater likelihood of 
successful reorganization.”169 The appointment of a trustee, on the other 
hand, may delay and hinder the Chapter 11 process due to the trustee’s 
lack of familiarity with the debtor’s business.170 Accordingly, reasons 
                                                                                                                 
that of a judge in an adversarial civil proceeding. Unlike all other forms of adversarial 
jurisprudence, the judge’s essential role is not to decide between competing claims of 
litigants. Rather, the judge oversees the process and makes sure that the parties comply 
with the rules.”). 
 164. For instance, the Bankruptcy Code uses Chapter 7 for debtor liquidations, 
Chapter 11 for debtor reorganizations, and Chapter 13 for consumer debt readjustments. 
 165. See In re Crouse, 9 B.R. 400, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981) (“The intent of the 
drafters of the Code was to provide similar approaches for all types of cases except 
where obviously inappropriate, for example rehabilitation versus liquidation.”). 
 166. See John T. Roache, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession, 
1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133, 138 (1993) (“In most cases, the debtor remains in control of 
the estates as DIP.”). 
 167. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-03 (2012). 
 168. See Roache, supra note 166, at 138 (“In Chapter 11 . . . a court appoints a 
trustee only when the need for one can be demonstrated.”). 
 169. See id. at 152 
 170. See In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781, 785-86 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(noting that appointment of a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is an “extraordinary remedy” 
because such action “will generally necessitate the [displacement] of the current 
experienced management with those probably less familiar with the field at a time when 
the enterprise itself is usually tottering on the brink of financial collapse”). 
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for leaving a debtor in a position of control in Chapter 11 coincide with 
its statutory purpose: rehabilitation of the debtor’s business.171 
In keeping with the theme of rehabilitation, another statutory aim 
for Chapter 11 was to limit the judge’s discretion in oversight over the 
case where Congress assumed that the debtor would re-emerge after the 
bankruptcy.172 As such, bankruptcy courts typically scrutinize a Chapter 
11 DIP’s actions under the business judgment rule.173 In the corporate 
context, the guiding view is that it is more appropriate for executives 
and directors to make business decisions than the courts.174  It is no 
surprise, therefore, that bankruptcy courts rarely hesitate to defer to the 
DIP’s judgment concerning transactional matters in Chapter 11 cases.175 
B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE TEST GOES TOO FAR 
The bankruptcy court’s more limited role in the Chapter 11 process 
provides credence for the argument against using the administrative 
expense test to evaluate break-up fees in § 363 sales. 176  The 
                                                                                                                 
 171. C-TC 9th Ave, P’ship v. Norton Co. ( In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship), 113 F.3d 
1304, 1310 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to assist 
financially distressed business enterprises by providing them with breathing space in 
which to return to a viable state.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 172. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 746 
(1993) (“One of the key concepts behind Chapter 11 was to remove bankruptcy judges 
from the administration of bankruptcy cases and permit them to act solely in a judicial 
capacity.”). 
 173. See, e.g., COR Route 5 Co., LLC v. The Penn Traffic Co. (In re Penn Traffic 
Co.), 524 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2009); Covey v. Soy Capital Bank and Trust Company (In re T.A. 
Brinkoetter & Sons, Inc.), No. 09-80727, 2012 WL 1865485 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 22, 
2012). 
 174. See, e.g., In re Lyon & Reboli, Inc., 24 B.R. 152 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(“[D]isagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial resolution. The 
courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consultant.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 175. See e.g., In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 509 B.R. 455, 463 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A court will generally not second-guess a debtor’s business judgment 
regarding whether the assumption or rejection of a contract will benefit the debtor’s 
estate.”); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(“[T]he Code favors the continued operation of a business by a debtor and a 
presumption of reasonableness attaches to a debtor’s management decisions.”). 
 176. See Part III.A. 
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administrative expense test is inherently an ex-post facto method of 
review.177 To decide whether to approve a payment as an administrative 
expense, the bankruptcy court must use hindsight to assess whether the 
expense was “actual” and “necessary” to preserve the value of the 
estate. 178  Notably, the issue before the court in In re O’Brien was 
whether or not to approve a post-sale petition for a break-up fee, as 
opposed to the typical scenario in which a break-up fee is considered 
prior to the sale.179 Therefore, the Third Circuit was not truly evaluating 
the merits of a break-up fee provision.180 Rather, the Court was really 
reviewing a claimant’s § 503(b) request for fees that happened to arise 
out of a break-up fee agreement. 181  Unlike complex financial 
transactions, payment of an administrative claim is a feature of 
bankruptcy law that comes within the ken of the bankruptcy court, not 
the business executives of the debtor.182 Thus, under the circumstances, 
the court was within its bounds to assess whether that particular request 
for a break-up fee was reasonable under § 503.183 
In practice, however, most bankruptcy courts deal with pre-sale 
approval of break-up fee provisions. 184  Therefore, most § 363 sales 
require bankruptcy courts to consider the merits of a break-up fee prior 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Kevin M. Baum, It’s Not About Breaking Up: A Contract-Consideration Based 
“Dowry” as an Alternative to Breakup Fees in Bankruptcy, 2012 Ann. Surv. of Bankr. 
Law 11, part C, 1 (2012) (noting that the administrative expense test requires the court 
to use “hindsight”). 
 178. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 179. In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 180. See White, supra note 50, at 680-81 (arguing that “because Reliant concerned a 
pre-auction break-up fee request, Section 503 and O’Brien were inapplicable”). 
 181. Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10-11 (arguing that the O’Brien court was really 
adjudicating a “request by an alleged administrative claimant asserting the right to 
payment under section 503(b)”). 
 182. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(a) (2012); see also Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10 
(commenting that under the factual circumstances of the O’Brien case, “the Third 
Circuit’s ruling that Calpine’s request should be governed by section 503(b) rather than 
section 363(b)(1) is understandable and most likely correct”). 
 183. See supra notes 180-81. 
 184. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10 (citing Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. 
Waisman, Asset Sales & Auctions: A Primer, 826 Comm. Law & Prac. Practice Guide 
Handbook Series 105, 162 (2001)). 
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to the actual auction.185 As one commentator has succinctly stated: “[i]n 
order to apply the section 503(b) standard to a presale break-up fee, a 
court would have to make a determination as to whether the fee is actual 
and necessary to preserve the value of the estate, without having seen 
the actual outcome of the bidding process.”186 Practically speaking, it is 
quite difficult for a court to determine the necessity of a break-up fee 
prior to observing its effects.187 That is to say, a debtor will not be able 
to know if stipulating to a break-up fee with the stalking horse bidder 
was beneficial until after the sale is consummated.188  Therefore, the 
decision to utilize a break-up fee as a bidding incentive is more of a 
business issue than a typical bankruptcy procedure.189 Consequently, it is 
a concern that should be dealt with, at least in part, by relying on the 
business acumen of the Chapter 11 debtor. 
C. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IS INAPT BECAUSE § 363 SALES ARE 
DISTINCT FROM NON-DISTRESSED SALES 
The transactional aspect of break-up fees within § 363 sales, insofar 
as it relates to the competing judgments of the bankruptcy court and the 
debtor, indicates that the administrative expense test is unsuitable for 
determining whether to award break-up fees to stalking horse bidders.190 
Simply put, the administrative expense test affords the court too much 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See Garza et al., supra note 42, at 10 (noting that a “typical” 363 sale consists 
of the stalking horse or debtor seeking approval of the proposed break-up fee prior to 
the auction). 
 186. McGrath, supra note 7, n.193-94 and accompanying text. 
 187. Id. at n.193-94 and accompanying text (concluding that “using the O’Brien 
section 503(b) administrative expense test to determine whether a presale break-up fee 
should be allowed is not only impractical, it is impossible”). 
 188. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.193-94 and accompanying text (“Courts should 
not be able to determine whether a break-up fee is ‘actual and necessary’ unless there 
has been an auction with which the court can determine whether the fee was actual and 
necessary.”). 
 189. See McGrath, supra note 7, at n.214-15 and accompanying text (“Break-up fees 
only come into existence as part of a section 363 sale and are never seen in any other 
context in bankruptcy.”). 
 190. See Part III.A (explaining that the administrative expense test is unsuitable for 
review of break-up fees because it is an ex-post test, whereas break-up fee approvals are 
typically requested prior to auction, and have more characteristics of a business 
decision than a bankruptcy procedure). 
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control in an area that is best left in the hands of the debtor.191 This is not 
to say, however, that the debtor should be entitled to the deference 
afforded by the business judgment rule when deciding whether to 
include a break-up fee provision into a purchase agreement in a § 363 
sale. Instead, courts should consider, but not blindly follow the debtor’s 
judgment because § 363 sales are distinct from non-distressed asset 
sales.192 
A comparative analysis of healthy versus distressed asset sales 
indicates that the two processes are far too different to defer to the 
business judgment of the debtor in the latter case.193 In healthy corporate 
combinations, whether or not by auction, the management’s 
responsibility is to produce the best return for the shareholders. 194 
Consequently, in the non-distressed situation the business’s management 
constructs a deal that ultimately affects the potential profits earned by 
the shareholders. 195  Whether or not a shareholder profits from its 
ownership stake in a company is a risk intrinsically linked to the 
shareholder’s investment in that company.196 Therefore, the margin for 
error afforded to a corporation’s management in a healthy asset sale 
correlates to the investment risk contemplated by the corporation’s 
shareholders. 197  On the other hand, a DIP’s duty is to the estate’s 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See McGrath, supra note 7, n.190. 
 192. See In re Tiara Motorcoach Corp., 212 B.R. 133, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1997) 
(“A sale pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code is not in the ordinary course of 
business, and the business judgment of the debtor should not be solely relied upon. 
Rather, a court should insure that revenues are maximized and that the best interests of 
the debtor’s estate, creditors and equity holders are furthered.”). 
 193. See Markell, supra note 15, at 376 (arguing that “it makes little sense blindly to 
adopt corporate rules for bankruptcy transactions”). 
 194. See id. at 372 (stating that, in the corporate context, “[e]ven if an auction duty 
is applicable, [management must] conduct a fair process designed to yield the best price 
for the shareholders”). 
 195. See id. at 376 (noting that in corporate combinations “[e]very marginal dollar 
gained or lost through the use of breakup fees is just another dollar, more or less, of the 
shareholders’ profit”). 
 196. See id. at 376 (“The inability of management to maximize [company] profit 
due to bad business decisions is just one of the risks that shareholders assume when 
they invest.”). 
 197. Id. 
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creditors.198  The return reaped by a § 363 sale is not profit for the 
creditors, it is recompense.199 Accordingly, the methods used by a DIP’s 
management to consummate a § 363 sale must be limited because the 
beneficiaries of the sale, the creditors, are concerned with 
reimbursement, not reward. 200  Courts reviewing healthy corporate 
combinations have increased their level of scrutiny for break-up fees, 
despite their steadfast use of the business judgment rule for broad 
review of the entire transaction.201 It stands to reason that the divergent 
interests present in a Chapter 11 case merit a similar, if not greater, 
increase in the level of scrutiny applied towards break-up fees in § 363 
sales.  
D. THE NON-PLAN LIQUIDATION ASPECT OF § 363 JUSTIFIES THE USE OF 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE ESTATE TEST 
The absence of extra protection for the estate’s creditors inherent in 
the business judgment rule is particularly concerning due to the 
tendency for § 363 sales to become non-plan liquidations of 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See In re Grabill Corp., 113 B.R. 966, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (“A Chapter 
11 debtor-in-possession administers the assets of the estate and any business conducted 
therein, as a fiduciary for both the equity interests and creditors.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 199. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (defining creditor as, inter alia, an “entity that has a claim 
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the 
debtor”). It is important to note that debts are generally incurred by the parties to a 
healthy business relationship, thus the cash generated by a § 363 sale goes toward the 
creditor’s predetermined remuneration, not toward an additional return on the creditor’s 
investment. 
 200. See In re Betacom of Phoenix, Inc., 240 F.3d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(commenting that, “shareholders expect to take more risk than creditors in return for the 
right to participate in firm profits. The creditor only expects repayment of a fixed 
debt”); see also Markell, supra note 15, at 374 (“Since creditors often face a loss even 
in the best of bankruptcies, bankruptcy sales are supposed to yield the best deal that will 
result in distributable dividends to unpaid creditors.”). 
 201. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 683 F.Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988) (noting in its analysis that break-up fees in corporate combinations “are not 
illegal where they enhance rather than chill bidding”); see also Samjens Partners I v. 
Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F.Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“In coordinating the 
bidding process, the board can institute strategies, such as . . . a break-up fee . . . but 
only if their strategies enhance the bidding.”). 
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substantially all of the debtor’s assets.202 Although Chapter 11 provides 
debtors with the opportunity to sell assets, that feature is typically in 
consideration of the debtor’s re-emergence as a going concern after the 
bankruptcy.203 In essence, § 363 sales have become a backdoor way for 
debtors to completely liquidate without going through the traditional 
Chapter 7 process.204 Whether or not a break-up fee ultimately increases 
the price received for the liquidation sale, 205  the break-up fee does 
nominally reduce the net return on the assets and therefore, the value for 
the estate. 206  For that reason, when the debtor’s focus shifts from 
rehabilitation to liquidation, the bankruptcy court’s focus must shift 
from preserving the debtor’s business as a going concern to securing the 
greatest distribution for the debtor’s creditors.207  As a corollary, this 
shift in focus requires a heightened level of scrutiny for the award of 
break-up fees.208 
From a policy standpoint, it seems that the court’s role in the § 363 
process should mirror that of the heightened supervision of Chapter 7.209 
Yet, that position does not take into account the benefits of the debtor’s 
                                                                                                                 
 202. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (noting this trend). 
 203. See In re Bombay Co., Inc., 07-44084-RFN-11, 2007 WL 2826071 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007) (noting that, “chapter “is not intended principally as a vehicle 
for sales of virtually all estate property under § 363(b)(1) . . . The court would infinitely 
prefer that a chapter 11 case be resolved through the plan process”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 204. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (noting that the sale of the debtor’s entire 
business was neither intended nor contemplated by the drafters of § 363) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 205. See Markell, supra note 15, at 360-69 (debating this point). 
 206. The break-up fee lowers the net return on the sale of assets because it is 
deducted from the proceeds of the sale. 
 207. Jessica Uziel, Section 363(b) Restructuring Meets the Sound Business Purpose 
Test with Bite: An Opportunity to Rebalance the Competing Interests of Bankruptcy 
Law, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1189, 1197 (2011) (noting that the § 363 sales must be 
scrutinized more closely than traditional Chapter 11 sales because of the process’s 
potential to “deviate from several goals of bankruptcy law” such as “securing equal 
distribution among creditors of the same class”). 
 208. Cf. id. 
 209. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (outlining the duties of the trustee and 
highlighting the necessity for court approval for the trustee’s actions), with notes supra 
169-171 and accompanying text. 
2015] REWARD THE STALKING HORSE  493 
OR PRESERVE THE ESTATE 
 
familiarity with its own business.210 Nonetheless, the court must provide 
heightened scrutiny for unique circumstances in § 363 sales, such as 
break-up fees, where creditors are not afforded the protections typical to 
an asset sale under a plan of reorganization.211 Most notably, creditors 
must approve sales conducted pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan via the 
confirmation process. 212  In that regard, the onus is on the debtor’s 
management to formulate a suitable plan. On the other hand, once a 
court allows a debtor to proceed with a non-plan sale, § 363’s notice and 
hearing requirements put the burden on the estate’s creditors to object.213 
In short, plan confirmation is conditioned upon creditor approval, 
whereas § 363 sale approval depends on the creditors’ inability or 
failure to object.214 This is particularly troubling given § 363 sales’ non-
specific notice provision, which merely requires the debtor to give 
notice “as is appropriate in the particular circumstances.”215 Unlike a 
plan sale’s formal disclosure obligations, 216  § 363’s relaxed notice 
requirement weakens creditors ability to both understand and object to 
the sale.217 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (noting that the Chapter 11 DIP’s “[p]re-
existing business relationships and industry expertise are generally seen as tools to 
maximize the estate value, especially when compared to the options of distressed sales 
or public auctions by a trustee in Chapter 7”). 
 211. See In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85, 88 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) 
(noting that the Court had a responsibility to review this proposed § 363 sale carefully 
because, inter alia, “the sale will liquidate a substantial asset of Debtor; and the sale is a 
preconfirmation sale controlled by the Debtor in Chapter 11, rather than a sale within a 
Chapter 7 case where a disinterested trustee controls the proposed liquidation of 
assets”). 
 212. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126(c) and 1129 (2012). 
 213. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1); Rose, supra note 27, at 260 (noting that “the onus 
for objecting to a § 363(b) transaction is borne by the objecting party”). 
 214. Rose, supra note 27, at 262; compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)-(8) (2012) 
(stating that the court can only confirm a plan of reorganization if, inter alia, each 
holder of a claim or interest has accepted the plan), with 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2012) 
(stating that “[t]he trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than 
in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate”). 
 215. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)(A) (2012). 
 216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012). 
 217. See Rose, supra note 27, at 259 (“With a § 363 sale, fewer people receive less 
information, and the lack of a disclosure requirement weakens creditor leverage when 
compared with what leverage they may have had with Chapter 11 plan confirmation.”). 
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Ironically, bankruptcy courts were tasked with weighing similar 
conflicting interests when they first faced the issue of whether to 
approve § 363 sales for debtors who intended to sell the majority or all 
of their assets.218 Although commonplace now, bankruptcy courts were 
initially hesitant to allow debtors to use § 363 in a way that would 
effectively circumvent the plan process.219 The standard used today, the 
“sound business purpose” test, 220  was first articulated in the Second 
Circuit case In re Lionel Corporation.221 Reviewing a § 363 sale of 
substantially all of the debtor’s assets, the Court had to determine 
whether the proposed sale, although applied for by the debtor and 
supported by the creditor’s committee, was valid under Chapter 11 
where it faced legitimate objection by the debtor’s equity 
shareholders.222 Instead of simply relying on the business judgment rule, 
the court established that the business justification required to warrant a 
§ 363 sale must ultimately take into account the interests of the estate.223 
                                                                                                                 
 218. See In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) 
(arguing that selling substantially all of the debtor’s assets via 363 “side-steps the 
procedural and substantive provisions of Chapter 11 itself, including the disclosure 
statement, vote and confirmation standards”) (internal citations omitted). 
 219. Id. at 590 (holding that “Section 363(b) does not authorize sale of all or 
substantially all assets of the estate”). 
 220. In re Titusville Country Club, 128 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991). 
 221. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The rule we adopt 
requires that a judge determining a § 363(b) application expressly find from the 
evidence presented before him at the hearing a good business reason to grant such an 
application.”). 
 222. See id. at 1066 (“The Committee of Equity Security Holders . . . appealed this 
order claiming that the sale, prior to approval of a reorganization plan, deprives the 
equity holders of the Bankruptcy Code’s safeguards of disclosure, solicitation and 
acceptance and divests the debtor of a dominant and profitable asset which could serve 
as a cornerstone for a sound plan. . . .The Creditors’ Committee favors the sale because 
it believes it is in the best interests of Lionel and because the sale is expressly 
authorized by § 363(b) of the Code. [The Debtor] tells us that . . . [the] sale will provide 
the estate with the large block of the cash needed to fund its plan of reorganization.”). 
 223. Id. at 1071 (“In fashioning its findings, a bankruptcy judge must not blindly 
follow the hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, he should 
consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, act to further 
the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity holders, alike.”); see Uziel, 
supra note 207, at 1200 (“In determining that the ‘appeasement of major creditors’ 
alone does not constitute a good business reason for judicial approval of a § 363 sale, 
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OR PRESERVE THE ESTATE 
 
Similar to the sound business purpose test, the best interests of the 
estate test considers the business judgment of the debtor while adding an 
additional level of protection for the interests of the estate.224 To achieve 
this effect, the best interests test allows the bankruptcy court to consider 
both the procedural and substantive validity of the proposed break-up 
fee. 225  Procedurally, the test first confirms that the debtor made an 
appropriate business decision when negotiating the break-up fee.226 This 
ensures that the experienced judgment of the debtor is not overlooked in 
the § 363 process, which is fundamentally a business transaction.227 The 
                                                                                                                 
the Second Circuit implied that the business justification in the bankruptcy context must 
take into account equity and creditor interests, in addition to the business’s interests.”). 
 224. Compare In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1071 (describing relevant factors of 
the sound business purpose test to be: “the proportionate value of the asset to the estate 
as a whole, the amount of elapsed time since the filing, the likelihood that a plan of 
reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near future, the effect of the 
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization, the proceeds to be obtained from 
the disposition vis-a-vis any appraisals of the property, which of the alternatives of use, 
sale or lease the proposal envisions and whether the asset is increasing or decreasing in 
value”), with In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. 191, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) 
(describing the relevant factors to be considered using the best interests of the estate test 
as: “Whether the fee requested correlates with a maximization of value to the debtor’s 
estate; Whether the underlying negotiated agreement is an arms-length transaction 
between the debtor’s estate and the negotiating acquirer; Whether the principal secured 
creditors and the official creditors committee are supportive of the concession; Whether 
the subject break-up fee constitutes a fair and reasonable percentage of the proposed 
purchase price; Whether the dollar amount of the break-up fee is so substantial that it 
provides a “chilling effect” on other potential bidders; The existence of available 
safeguards beneficial to the debtor’s estate; Whether there exists a substantial adverse 
impact upon unsecured creditors, where such creditors are in opposition to the break-up 
fee”) (emphasis added). 
 225. See In re Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 166 B.R. 908, 912 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) 
(explaining that the best interests of the estate test includes “a determination that all 
aspects of the transaction are in the best interests of all concerned”). 
 226. See, e.g., In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 194 (noting at the outset of its 
analysis of whether to award the bidder’s request for a break-up fee that the fee was 
negotiated as part of an “arms-length” transaction and constituted a fair and reasonable 
fee with respect to the magnitude of the transaction). 
 227. See, e.g., In re Sea Island Co., 10-21034, 2010 WL 4393269 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 
Sept. 15, 2010) (approving the fee, inter alia, because “the record establish[ed] that [the 
sale] was an arms-length transaction, given the lengthy negotiations between multiple 
parties over the terms and amount of the break-up fee from at least the second round of 
the process”). 
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best interests test, however, goes one step further by reviewing the 
substance of the transaction to confirm that the break-up fee has or will 
improve the outcome of the § 363 sale.228 This additional safeguard 
helps to realign the § 363 sale towards its fundamental purpose of 
generating value for the estate’s creditors.229 
CONCLUSION 
The best interests of the estate test constitutes the appropriate level 
of scrutiny for break-up fees § 363 sales. The administrative expense 
test ignores the business expertise of the debtor and makes it 
exceedingly difficult for courts to award break-up fees to stalking horse 
bidders that take on the risk of purchasing distressed assets via public 
auction. On the other end of the spectrum, the deference required by the 
business judgment rule, if applied to the debtor’s acquiescence to a 
break-up fee, 230  would “straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to 
prevent him from doing what is best for the estate.”231 By reviewing 
break-up fees under the best interests of the estate test, bankruptcy 
courts are able to shield creditors from undue harm to the estate while 
providing financially sophisticated debtors with a swift process by 
which to liquidate assets. Using the best interests of the estate test for 
break-up fees provides courts with the heightened control over § 363 
sales implicated by the provision’s role in modern Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. If applied consistently throughout bankruptcy courts, the 
best interests of the estate test will provide the appropriate level of 
protection for Chapter 11 creditors and will help guide debtors and 
stalking horse bidders towards consummating efficient and fair § 363 
sales. 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See In re Hupp Indus., Inc., 140 B.R. at 195-96 (explaining that the court 
denied the break-up fee because, although it appeared reasonable and was fairly 
negotiated, the provision was non-contingent. As such, the fee was “an unwarranted 
expense upon the Debtor’s estate”). 
 229. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 230. See supra Part II.B (indicating that it is most likely the situation that a stalking 
horse bidder would request the break-up fee and the debtor would agree to it, not vice 
versa). 
 231. In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983). 
